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1 Introduction 
We study the effects of method choice on the event study results related to a well-
studied regulatory change that took place in the U.S. in 1995. Fast flow of infor-
mation related to a Presidential veto and its subsequent overturn, paired with a 
well-defined set of most affected industries, make the Public Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 an interesting case study. Consistent with prior simulation 
studies, we find that event-induced variance and cross-sectional dependence have 
a marked effect on event study results in a case with severe event date clustering. 
We also report significant differences among different methods to account for 
cross-sectional correlation. 
Event study methods have become the work horse of empirical finance research, 
and much of what we know, in particular of corporate finance, is based on event 
study evidence. While MacKinlay (1997) notes early uses of the method already 
in the 1930s, the increased availability of daily stock returns since the 1970s has 
been an important factor in making event study the method of choice in many 
finance inquiries.1 According to Kothari & Warner (2007), 212 papers in the 
Journal of Finance make use of the event study methodology between 1975 and 
2000. Further, Kolari & Pynnönen (2010, online appendix) list 75 event studies in 
leading finance journals that have accounted for event-inflated variance and 
cross-sectional correlation.  
As the event study methodology is providing important evidence regarding finan-
cial phenomena, it is of utmost importance for finance researchers to have a solid 
understanding of the strengths and the pitfalls of the method. Along with event 
study’s popularity, a much-needed literature has grown on the methodological 
                                                 
 
1 Fama, et al. (1969) is often viewed as the inaugural short-term event study in finance. 
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aspects of event studies. Thanks to those influential works, our knowledge has 
greatly increased over the years regarding the size and power properties of tests 
used in event studies, and the effects of issues such as event-induced variance and 
cross-sectional association between events2 
Most of the previous studies on the statistical properties of the event study meth-
odology make use of simulations, where the method’s ability to capture a known 
economic effect chosen by the researcher is measured. In this paper, we have cho-
sen a different path. We use an actual event with widespread effects on stock re-
turns, as we re-visit a well-studied regulatory change that took place in the U.S. in 
1995. In December 1995, the U.S. congress enacted on the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act (PSLRA), which would limit investors’ ability to sue firms in 
securities fraud cases. However, President Clinton used his veto power on De-
cember 19, 1995 to overturn the legislation. The House of Representatives and the 
Senate subsequently voted to override the Presidential veto on December 20 and 
December 22, respectively. The fast flow of opposite types of information in this 
case provide an excellent opportunity for researchers to study the economic ef-
fects of the legislation. Indeed, a number of previous studies have considered the 
effects of the PSLRA on stock prices in industries that are most disposed to secu-
rities litigation, namely computers, electronics, pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, 
and retailing.3  
As far as we can tell, the previous studies on the PSLRA fail to account for event-
induced variance, which is of special concern in event studies with event date 
clustering, especially in those concerning regulatory changes, as they affect all 
sample firms simultaneously (Binder, 1985). The issue is an important one, as 
Harrington & Shrider (2007) show that problems with event-induced variance 
intensify in presence of cross-sectional correlation in the effects, and Kolari & 
Pynnönen (2010) provide evidence that even low levels of such correlation have a 
marked effect on inferences drawn from an event study. Obviously, in events with 
common event days, abundant potential sources for cross-sectional correlation 
exist. The use of a limited number of industry portfolios is also likely to increase 
the cross-sectional correlation within the sample. All three above-mentioned stud-
ies on the PSLRA use the so called portfolio method, which is suggested by Jaffe 
(1974) and Campbell, et al. (1997) as a solution to the cross-sectional dependence 
problems arising from extreme event date clustering in cases such as regulatory 
                                                 
 
2 See e.g. Brown & Warner (1980, 1985), Boehmer, et al. (1991), and Kolari & Pynnönen (2010, 
2011). 
3 For prior studies on PSLRA, see Spiess & Tkac (1997), Johnson, et al. (2000), and Ali & Kalla-
pur (2001). For analysis of litigation risk in the aforementioned industries, see Francis, et al. 
(1994). 
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changes4. However, as Kolari & Pynnönen (2010) note, the portfolio method suf-
fers from low power. In this study, we use the Kolari & Pynnönen (2010) Adj-
BMP test statistic to account for cross-sectional correlation in the effects of the 
PSLRA events, and contrast our findings with those obtained from the alternative 
methods. 
2    The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
The main purpose of the suggested PSLRA was to limit frivolous securities fraud 
law suits. A bipartisan view at the time was that the balance between deterring 
securities fraud and assuring that the private securities litigation process was not 
used abusively was severely tilted, and speculative securities class action suits 
were common (Phillips & Miller, 1996).  Class action suits on securities fraud 
typically originate from alleged corporate misstatements that have resulted in 
losses to those investors who have bought the shares at artificially high prices. 
Prior to the PSLRA, the plaintiffs could file a law suit without identifying any 
specific corporate actions that had misled the investors. In order to curb frivolous 
filings, the PSLRA included provisions that required plaintiffs to specify the facts 
behind their claims. Furthermore, if the suit was later to be found frivolous, the 
plaintiffs would face penalties, such as paying the other parties’ attorneys’ fees 
(Ali & Kallapur, 2001). Also, the provisions of the PSLRA would limit liability 
of those defendants with a limited role in the alleged misconduct (King & 
Schwartz, 1997), whereas previously, large claims that were disproportionate in 
comparison to their part of the blame had been addressed to “deep-pocket defend-
ants”, such as accounting firms.  
A common problem with event studies into law reforms is that regulatory changes 
take time, and their content tends to be intensely discussed, both publicly and pri-
vately, during the process. The PSLRA makes no exception to this, as Avery 
(1996) points to a “long and winding road” towards the proposal. Ali & Kallapur 
(2001) consider 18 legislative events during 1995, leading into the Presidential 
veto on December 20. Their portfolio of high litigation firms exhibits statistically 
significant returns on only six of those days. The relative lack of findings during 
the progress towards the PSLRA is likely to be due to the gradual learning of the 
                                                 
 
4 A simple way to account for event-induced variance in such setting would be to use heteroske-
dasticity-robust standard errors in hypothesis testing. However, Harrington & Shrider (2007) re-
port that such consideration was not common at the time. Accordingly, none of the three previ-
ous empirical inquiries into the stock reactions upon the PSLRA mentions any corrections for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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regulation among market participants. However, the events around the Presiden-
tial veto in late December 1995 are likely to be less perfectly anticipated, and the 
significant event study evidence that is reported in prior studies on the reform 
supports that view.   
While the sudden changes in the legislative process provide an interesting labora-
tory to study the economic effects of the PSLRA reform, some of the opposite 
effects unfortunately coincide, which challenges the clean identification in our 
study, and the previous studies alike. After the Congressional approval of the 
PSLRA, President Clinton received the bill on December 6, 1995. Clinton would 
have to sign the bill by December 19, 1995, or it would automatically become 
law. While the President was initially prepared to sign the bill, at the end, he ve-
toed it less than one hour before the deadline on December 19, 1995 (Johnson, et 
al., 2000). The House overrode his veto the next day, so that information regard-
ing both the Presidential veto and the House override reached the market on the 
same trading day. However, rumors of eventual veto surfaced already on Decem-
ber 18, 1995, for which reason we follow prior studies into the PSLRA, and con-
sider that date as our first event date5.  All three previous studies on the reform 
find the December 20, 1995 abnormal returns to be positive and significant in the 
sample of high litigation industries, whereas December 18, 1995 abnormal returns 
are systematically negative. 
3 Estimation and testing 
When testing for event effects, the test statistic should account at least for (A) 
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity, (B) event-induced variance inflation, and (C) 
cross-sectional correlation. In the following treatment, we start by defining the 
models for abnormal returns and mean abnormal returns, and continue by stating 
three models for testing event effects in an increasing order of complication. Lat-
er, we also consider two additional models for reference. 
We use continuously compounded abnormal returns in excess return format. They 
are defined as 
                                                 
 
5 Both Johnson, et al. (2000), and Spiess & Tkac (1997) mention that on Friday, December 15, 
President Clinton had a dinner with William Lerach, who was not only a well-known lawyer be-
hind numerous securities fraud cases, and a vocal opponent of the PSLRA, but also a significant 
donor to the Democratic party. They speculate that the dinner affected Clinton’s view on the 
PSLRA. 
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where 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑒  is the abnormal return in excess of the risk-free rate of return for 
event i, 𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑒  is the observed excess return, and E(𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑒 ) is the expected return. The 
estimation window ends at T1, the event day is given by t, and the whole sample 
period ends at T2. We estimate the expected return with two alternative specifica-
tions, i.e., the Fama–French (1993) three-factor model (henceforth FF3) and the 
traditional one-factor market model: 
 ( ) 1,,,,, ,...,1, TtRRRRE tHMLHMLitSMBSMBiemtMieit =+++= βββα , (2) 
 ( ) 1, ,...,1, TtRRE emtMieit =+= βα , (3) 
where 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑒  is the excess return on the market, RSMB is the return on a portfolio 
with a long position in small company stocks and a short position in large-cap 
stocks, and RHML is the return on a portfolio with a long position in high book-to-
market stocks and a short position in low book-to-market stocks. 
The effect of the event can be measured by the average abnormal return on the 
event day (day t=0), which is defined as 
  ∑
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Another measure is given by the average standardized abnormal return, defined as 
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where si is the time-series standard deviation over the estimation period. We pre-
fer the specification in Equation (5), as standardizing alleviates problems with 
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity (A). The economic effect of the event should be 
assessed from the easy-to-understand average abnormal return, while the average 
standardized abnormal return is used for statistical significance testing. 
The first statistic is the classic test calculating the standard error from the estima-
tion period, in our paper labelled the standardized residuals test (SRT): 
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where 2,Patis  is an estimate for the time-series standard deviation of the estimation 
period abnormal returns, incorporating a degrees of freedom correction as in Pa-
tell (1976) that stems from using an estimated standard deviation instead of the 
true standard deviation. Without the correction the denominator of Equation (6) 
simplifies to N1 . In ASAR0,PC, a prediction error correction has been made on 
the individual standardized abnormal returns. The correction arises from using 
regression parameters from the estimation period on predicting the normal return 
in the event period (see for example Campbell, et al. (1997), p. 159). Generally, 
the corrections are fairly small. Following the Lindeberg–Feller central limit theo-
rem, SRT follows asymptotically the standard normal distribution. 
While SRT accounts for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity (A), the statistic over-
states the significance in presence of an event-induced increase in variance (B). 
To alleviate the problem, Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) combine the 
standardized residuals test and the cross-sectional approach to a statistic we label 
BMP: 
  
Ns
ASAR
BMP
PEASAR
PE
/
,0
,0= , (7) 
where ASAR0,PE is corrected with the prediction error correction, and PEASARs ,0  is an 
estimate of the cross-sectional standard deviation. BMP is t-distributed with N–1 
degrees of freedom. 
Neither SRT nor BMP accounts for cross-sectional correlation (C) among the ab-
normal returns, which is likely to plague evaluations concerning individual indus-
tries or studies that exhibit event-day clustering. Kolari & Pynnönen (2010) pro-
pose a correction to the BMP test that adjusts for cross-sectional correlation. We 
label the test KP, while Kolari & Pynnönen (2010) denote it as Adj–BMP: 
 ( )( ) ( )rN
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where r  is the average correlation among the abnormal returns over the estima-
tion period. If r  is zero, KP simplifies back to BMP. The KP test is robust against 
all malign properties (A), (B) and (C) we mention above. KP is t-distributed with 
N–1 degrees of freedom.  
For reference, we also use the crude dependence adjustment (CDA) set forth by 
Brown & Warner (1980, 1985): 
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The standard error of CDA is simply the standard deviation of the time-series of 
average standardized abnormal returns over the estimation period. While this test 
accounts for cross-sectional correlation, it fails to account for event induced vari-
ance. CDA is t-distributed with T1–1 degrees of freedom. 
Finally, we also consider the portfolio method and use a regression model. The 
model is given by 
  ,,,1, 2,
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where e tpR ,  is the continuously compounded excess return on an equally-weighted 
portfolio over the whole sample period, e tmR ,  the corresponding excess return on 
the market portfolio, and Dj,t are indicator variables that take the value one on 
each of the event days and zero otherwise. The dates are defined in the next sec-
tion. The parameters γj capture the event effects, which we then test both using 
OLS standard errors, and standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation as in Andrews (1991), labelled HACSE. With event dates heavily 
clustered in calendar time, the CDA test, in which abnormal returns are estimated 
first, and the significance of the average abnormal return is then tested, is fairly 
similar to the portfolio method, in which the portfolio of returns is formed first, 
and the abnormal returns are then extracted. The main difference in our applica-
tion is that the former uses standardized abnormal returns while the latter is based 
on non-standardized returns. 
4 Data and results 
In accordance with previous studies on the PSLRA, we use CRSP as our data 
source for daily stock returns. The factor returns for the Fama–French three-factor 
model are retrieved from Kenneth French’s online data library. We limit our 
analysis to industries that are indicated as having high litigation risk in Francis, et 
al. (1994), namely computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics 
(SIC codes 3600-3674), pharmaceuticals/biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 
and 8731-8734), and retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961). In the tests where firm-
level abnormal returns are estimated, our estimation period starts on 3 January 
8      Acta Wasaensia 
1995 and ends 1 December 1995, and it thus comprises of 233 observations. 
There are slight variations between our paper and the prior studies on the PSLRA, 
regarding both estimation period and sample selection. In applying the portfolio 
method, the prior studies include the returns for the entire calendar year of 1995, 
in other words the time after the events is also included. We follow their choice in 
our portfolio tests. As the portfolio returns are tabulated on a day-by-day basis, 
Ali & Kallapur (2001) use a sample that varies in size throughout the estimation 
period due to missing returns. On the other hand, Johnson, et al. (2000) require 
their firms to “have a complete 1995 daily returns data”. As we estimate abnormal 
returns for each individual firm separately, we require a minimum of 50 observa-
tions during the estimation period, with no missing values during the last ten days 
of the estimation window. Nevertheless, by using these filters, we retain a sample 
that is very similar in size to the prior studies. In comparison to Ali & Kallapur 
(2001), whose range of number of firms per industry is indicated in parentheses, 
our sample consists of 562 (492-579 in Ali & Kallapur, 2001) firms in computers, 
472 (430-484) firms in electronics, 74 (74-79) firms in pharmaceuticals, and 434 
(441-450) firms in retail.6 Based on the flow of events around the Presidential 
veto and its overturn, as described in Section 2, we consider the following event 
dates: 18 December 1995, 20 December 1995 and 22 December 1995. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. The time period is 3 January 1995 to 29 Decem-
ber 1995. All returns are continuously compounded, in percentage for-
mat and in excess of the risk-free rate of return. The industry portfolios 
are equally-weighted while the market portfolio is value-weighted. 
T = 252 Mean 
(annualized %) 
Volatility 
(annualized %) 
Minimum 
(in percent) 
Maximum 
(in percent) 
Skewness Excess 
kurtosis 
Computers 52.22 13.00 -3.95 1.80 -1.53 4.86 
Electronics 47.97 12.59 -3.40 2.12 -1.30 3.40 
Pharmaceuticals 32.65 10.19 -3.27 2.04 -0.75 3.20 
Retail 13.04 7.62 -1.91 1.15 -0.59 0.98 
Whole Sample 38.84 10.33 -3.03 1.50 -1.45 4.23 
Market portfolio 19.75 7.42 -1.78 1.35 -0.42 1.44 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for equally-weighted portfolios for each of 
the four industries, and for the combined whole sample portfolio, as well as for 
the value-weighted market portfolio. The time period is 3 January 1995 to 29 De-
                                                 
 
6 Ali & Kallapur (2001) note that Johnson et al. (2000) include SIC code 2830 in their pharmaceu-
tical sample, which results in a significantly larger set of 191 firms. They further speculate that 
the difference in sample selection accounts for the fact that Johnson et al. (2000) findings re-
garding the pharmaceutical industry’s reaction to the Senate override on 12/22/1995 deviate 
from those reported in Ali & Kallapur (2001) and Spiess & Tkac (1997). Johnson, et al. (2000) 
also separate Hardware and Software firms from the set that is very similar to our Computers 
sub-sample, and they do not consider the Retail industry in their analysis. 
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cember 1995, combining the estimation period, the event-dates and the post-event 
period, and thus totaling 252 observations. The returns are continuously com-
pounded excess returns in percentage format. The annualized mean returns are 
fairly high, ranging from 13.0 percent to 52.2 percent and averaging at 38.8 per-
cent, being almost twice the market return of 19.8 percent. The volatilities are 
fairly low, between 7.6 percent and 13.0 percent. Note, however, that the volatili-
ties for individual companies are much larger on average (not reported). The val-
ues for skewness and excess kurtosis suggest that the daily returns are not normal-
ly distributed. In fact, Jarque-Bera (1987) tests for normality (not reported) reject 
the null hypothesis of normally distributed returns for all series. 
We begin analyzing our data by having a first look at the time series of volatility 
in our sample. Figure 1 shows the cross-sectional standard deviation of the stand-
ardized abnormal returns based on the Fama-French three-factor model, and the 
five-day rolling standard deviation of the returns for our equally-weighted whole 
sample portfolio. Figure 1 clearly indicates that  the time series of our sample 
exhibits heteroskedasticity. Part of that heteroskedasticity is likely due to the in-
creased cross-sectional dependence during the event period, also indicated in Fig-
ure 1. Figure 1 thus serves as a further motivation for re-visiting the stock reac-
tions to the PSLRA. 
 
Figure 1. Daily standard deviation of the cross section and the 5-day rolling 
time series 
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Table 2. Tests for event effects on three event days for four industries. FF3 
refers to the Fama–French (1993) three-factor model (2) and Market 
to the one-factor market model (3). SRT is the standardized residuals 
test (6), BMP the Boehmer et al. (1991) test (7), KP the Kolari & 
Pynnönen (2010) test (8), and CDA the crude dependence adjustment 
test (9). Pf. Method refers to the model indicated in Equation (10). All 
tests are t-tests. HACSE is the Andrews (1991) heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent estimator for the standard error. * refers to 
statistical significance at 5 percent level,  and ** refers to 1 percent. 
 
 
 
Panel A. Computers 18 Dec 1995  20 Dec 1995  22 Dec 1995 
N = 562 FF3 Market  FF3 Market  FF3 Market 
Abnormal return -0.731 -1.908  -0.093 1.498  0.162 0.540 
Std abnormal return -0.122 -0.428  -0.056 0.338  0.007 0.103 
         
SRT -2.868** -10.088**  -1.320 7.979**  0.170 2.430* 
BMP -2.230* -7.913**  -1.031 6.279**  0.161 2.330* 
KP -1.424 -2.392*  -0.644 1.898  0.103 0.704 
CDA -1.789 -3.184**  -0.819 2.503*  0.108 0.765 
Pf. Method OLS  -3.335**   2.873**   1.068 
Pf. Method OLS HACSE  -7.132**   15.732**   14.080** 
         
Panel B. Electronics 18 Dec 1995  20 Dec 1995  22 Dec 1995 
N = 472 FF3 Market  FF3 Market  FF3 Market 
Abnormal return 0.198 -0.877  -0.584 0.906  -0.224 0.126 
Std abnormal return 0.113 -0.176  -0.110 0.276  -0.032 0.058 
         
SRT 2.452* -3.802**  -2.384* 5.960**  -0.682 1.263 
BMP 2.012* -2.261*  -2.009* 5.130**  -0.606 1.144 
KP 1.152 -1.084  -1.150 1.706  -0.347 0.380 
CDA 1.312 -1.317  -1.284 2.050*  -0.384 0.436 
Pf. Method OLS  -1.608   1.666   0.324 
Pf. Method OLS HACSE  -3.735**   9.566**   4.988** 
         
Panel C. Pharmaceuticals 18 Dec 1995  20 Dec 1995  22 Dec 1995 
N = 74 FF3 Market  FF3 Market  FF3 Market 
Abnormal return -1.894 -2.378  -0.075 0.764  0.168 0.350 
Std abnormal return -0.381 -0.522  -0.037 0.170  0.193 0.240 
         
SRT -3.265** -4.466**  -0.313 1.451  1.653 2.054* 
BMP -2.768** -3.658**  -0.228 0.989  1.555 1.945 
KP -2.135* -2.674*  -0.177 0.723  1.200 1.422 
CDA -2.231* -3.064**  -0.220 1.029  1.235 1.461 
Pf. Method OLS  -4.066**   1.387   0.667 
Pf. Method OLS HACSE  -14.856**   12.470**   9.821** 
         
Panel D. Retail 18 Dec 1995  20 Dec 1995  22 Dec 1995 
N = 434 FF3 Market  FF3 Market  FF3 Market 
Abnormal return -0.456 -0.889  -0.088 0.859  0.117 0.310 
Std abnormal return -0.097 -0.225  -0.077 0.197  -0.054 0.003 
         
SRT -2.019* -4.662**  -1.592 4.088**  -1.121 0.061 
BMP -1.665 -3.860**  -1.281 3.375**  -0.917 0.051 
KP -1.127 -1.954  -0.867 1.709  -0.621 0.026 
CDA -1.284 -2.326*  -1.014 2.109*  -0.747 0.032 
Pf. Method OLS  -2.179**   2.427*   1.131 
Pf. Method OLS HACSE  -7.672**   20.501**   16.136** 
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Table 2 shows the results both for the individual industries and for the whole 
sample. Both non-standardized and standardized abnormal returns are reported. In 
the interest of space, we only report test statistics that refer to the standardized 
tests. Along with the t-statistics for the SRT, BMP, KP, and CDA tests, we also 
report the t-statistics obtained from the regressions of portfolio time series, using 
Equation (10). 
Several interesting observations arise from Table 2. Looking at the whole sample, 
the results for 18 December are consistently negative and statistically significant 
across different methods for the market model. This is consistent with the prior 
studies mentioned above, with one exception. While Ali & Kallapur (2001) also 
find a negative reaction to the December 18 veto rumors when observing the 
“conventional p-value”, they note the Jain (1986) finding that significance levels 
from the market model tend to be overstated when the market return is large on 
the event date. They mitigate the problem, by using a randomization method, 
which results in a p-value of only 0.16.  
Our findings regarding December 20, 1995 indicate a positive and significant 
stock reaction when using the market model. Variability exists among industries 
and the Pharmaceuticals exhibit significant results only if the Portfolio HACSE 
method is considered. Finally, the December 22 results are weaker, albeit statisti-
cally significant with a number of samples and test statistics, such as the SRT and 
the BMP tests for the whole sample. Weaker findings are consistent with prior 
studies, as Johnson, et al. (2000) is the only one of the three studies to report sta-
tistically significant findings for the whole sample on that date.  
Another interesting observation can be made regarding the differences between 
the market model and the FF3 results. In numerous instances, the two methods 
provide opposite findings. For example, the December 20 findings for the whole 
sample are positive and significant when the market model is used, but when the 
Fama-French factors are included in the estimation of abnormal returns, the re-
sults turn negative, and in the case of SRT and BMP statistics even statistically 
significant. It is also interesting to note the average correlation used in the KP 
              
           
          
           
         
         
         
         
         
           
            
         
              
           
          
           
         
         
         
         
         
           
            
         
              
           
          
           
         
         
         
         
         
           
            
         
              
           
          
           
         
         
         
         
         
           
            
         
Panel E. Whole sample 18 Dec 1995  20 Dec 1995  22 Dec 1995 
N = 1542 FF3 Market  FF3 Market  FF3 Market 
Abnormal return -0.425 -1.328  -0.241 1.100  0.030 0.338 
Std abnormal return -0.055 -0.298  -0.077 0.271  -0.013 0.067 
         
SRT -2.159* -11.641**  -3.022** 10.580**  -0.520 2.632** 
BMP -1.744 -9.494**  -2.420* 8.585**  -0.461 2.365* 
KP -0.926 -2.227*  -1.285 2.014*  -0.245 0.555 
CDA -1.135 -2.875**  -1.588 2.613**  -0.273 0.650 
Pf. Method OLS  -3.023**    2.719**    0.961 
Pf. Method OLS HACSE  -6.809**   15.355**   13.647** 
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test. While the average correlation when using the FF3 model for the whole sam-
ple is 0.00165 (not reported), it is 0.01102 for the market model. This explains the 
larger corrections to the t-values when using the market model instead of the FF3 
model. 
Finally, we also observe large and seemingly systematic variation across test sta-
tistics. First, in comparison to the standardized residual test, the results tend to get 
statistically weaker when event-induced variance is accounted for, using the BMP 
method. However, the effect is generally moderate, which is somewhat surprising, 
given the large shift in the standard deviation around the event days, indicated in 
Figure 1. When the cross-sectional dependence is further accounted for by using 
the KP method, the t-values clearly decrease. This is intuitive, as the cross-
sectional dependence may exist within an industry that is affected by the PSLRA, 
even after controlling for market-wide effects. The results for CDA, also account-
ing for cross-sectional correlation, are in line with those of KP. The correction is 
not as strong as the CDA test does not account for event-inflated variance. In a 
case such as ours, the critical question is whether individual firms should be con-
sidered as independent observations, or if part of the cross-sectional dependence 
is represented by the industry reaction to the news.  
It is also worth noting that while the portfolio method with standard OLS gives 
results that are very comparable to the traditional abnormal return results, ac-
counting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation with the HACSE correction 
appears to boost the statistical significance to an extreme.7 Given the popularity 
of the portfolio method, as indicated by Kolari & Pynnönen (2010, online appen-
dix), the inconsistency between the BMP adjustment to the traditional abnormal 
returns, and the HACSE correction to portfolio abnormal returns is interesting. 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper we study the effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA), a regulatory change that took place in the U.S. in 1995, on four indus-
tries inclined to be affected by the reform. Despite some minor differences in 
sample selection procedures between our paper and the prior studies on the stock 
reactions to the PSLRA, our evidence is very similar to the previous results when 
                                                 
 
7 When we use the White (1980) standard errors only, instead of accounting also for autocorrela-
tion with HACSE, we obtain t-statistics of similar magnitude (not reported). Note that Harring-
ton & Shrider (2007) advocate the use of the regression method with White standard errors to 
account for event induced variance. 
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either the traditional event study methodology or the portfolio method with regu-
lar OLS t-statistics is used. We show, however, that the results are very sensitive 
to the choice of return generating model, and the choice between the market mod-
el and the FF3 model can even result in a change of the sign of the coefficient. 
We also show that correcting for event-inflated variance with the BMP method 
has a moderate effect on the significance of the results. However, when correcting 
for cross-sectional association between the abnormal returns as in Kolari & 
Pynnönen (2010), the significance of the results clearly decreases, showing that 
failing to account for cross-sectional effects may lead to spurious conclusions. 
The use of standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
in the portfolio setting results in a very large upward shift in t-statistics. This is a 
puzzling result, and calls for further research. 
Finally, we would like to congratulate Seppo Pynnönen on his 60th birthday. All 
the best!  
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